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TOWNSHIP ZONING REFERENDA; SUFFICIENCY OF CONTENTS
OF PETITION
Industrial, commercial and residential progress throughout Ohio has
stimulated increasing interest in the open land of rural counties. In many
instances, prior to any expansion into these areas, developers must obtain
zoning changes in order to accommodate proposed uses of land. The final
stage of a required zoning change is approval by the board of township
trustees. However, after the adoption of a new zoning amendment, elec-
tors of the township may submit a petition to the board of trustees request-
ing that the zoning amendment be placed on the ballot for the voters to
decide at the next election.
A discussion of the sufficiency of referenda petitions raises two consid-
erations. The first of these is the means by which the validity of signatures
appearing on the face of the petition is ascertained. 1 While this problem
raises its own difficulties, they are beyond the scope of the present analysis.
The second issue, the topic of this note, concerns the extent of informa-
tion, if any, that is required to be contained in a petition in order to provide
the prospective signer with notice of the issue to which he is asked to lend
his support. Recent cases by the Ohio appellate and supreme courts sug-
gest that there are inherent inequities in the petitioning process that have
been detrimental to both the developer and the residents of a township
area. In particular, the sufficiency of the petitioning statement, that is, the
description of the issue to be placed on the petition, is of concern.
Section 519.12 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth the procedure by
which amendments or supplements to township zoning resolutions are to
be made,' and the procedure by which a referendum may be effected. An
1 There are other questions which could also be considered under this general heading, such
as whether referenda of this type are constitutional under the Ohio Constitution or whether zon-
ing by popular vote is practical if a planned expansion program is desired. In Ohio, the ques.
tion of constitutionality under the state constitution has been spe.Ifically decided in the affitma.
tive. See Cook-Johnson Realty v. Bertolini, 15 Ohio St. 2d 1.95, 239 N.E.2d 80 (1968).
The question of practicality is beyond the scope of this study. For a discussion of that issue, see
Comment, 1969 LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 453.
2 Omo REV. CODE § 519.12 (Page Supp. 1970) in pertinent parts provides:
Amendments or supplements ... may be initiated by motion of the township rural
zoning commission, by the passage of a resolution therefore by the board of township
trustees or by the filing of an application therefor by one or more of the owners or leo-
sees of property within the area proposed to be changed or affected by the proposed
amendment or supplement with the township zoning commission ....
Upon the adoption of such motion, or the certification of such resolution or the fil-
ing of such application the township zoning commission shall set a date for a public
hearing thereon....
Within five days after the adoption of such motion or the certification of such reso-
lution or the filing of such application the township zoning commission shall transmit
a copy thereof together with text and map pertaining thereto to the county or regional
planning commission, if there is such a commission. The county or regional planning
commission shall recommend the approval or denial of the proposed amendment or
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amendment or supplement adopted under the above procedure by a town-
ship board of trustees can be prevented from taking effect at the end of 30
days, if, within 30 days after adoption
there is presented to the board of township trustees a petition, signed by
a number of qualified voters residing in the unincorporated area of the
township... equal to not less than eight percent of the total vote cast for
all candidates for governor in such areas at the last preceding general clec-
tion at which a governor was elected, requesting the board of township
trustees to submit the amendment or supplement to the electors of such area
for approval or rejection at the next primary or general election.3
On May 5, 1970, the trustees of Union Township, Clermont County,
Ohio. rejected the zoning commission's recommendation for approval of
Amendment 5, amending Article XV of the zoning code which concerned
the requirements for floor areas. Since the board's vote was not unani-
mous, the recommendation of the zoning commission would have taken ef-
fect 30 days after the trustees action, had not a petition with the required
number of signatures been filed requesting submission of the amendment
to the electors at the next election. The sufficiency of the contents of those
petitions" was later challenged in Sidwell v. Clepper.5
.The Common Pleas Court of Clermont County in Sidwell applied the
reasoning of Markus v. Trumbull County Board of Elections" and held that
since the second page of each part of the referendum petitions contained
an exact copy of the proposed amendment to the zoning code, and since
supplement or the approval of some modifications thereof and shall submit such rec-
ommendation to the township zoning commission. Such recommendation shall be
considered at the public hearing held by the township zoning commission on such pro-
posed amendment or supplement.
The township zoning commission shall, within thirty days after such hearing, rec-
ommend the approval or denial of the proposed amendment or supplement... and
submit such- recommendation together with such application or resolution, the text and
map pertaining thereto and the recommendation of the county or regional planning
commission thereon to the board of township trustees.
The board of township trustees shall upon receipt of such recommendations, set a
time for a public hearing....
Within twenty days after such public hearing the board shall either adopt or deny
the recommendations of the zoning commission or adopt some modification thereof.
In the event the board denies or modifies the recommendation of the township zoning
commission the unanimous vote of the board shall be required.
a Omo Ray. CODE § 519.12 (Page Supp. 1970).
4 In this case it was stipulated that there were a sufficient number of valid signatures.
5 25 Ohio Misc. 104 (C.P. Clermont County 1970).
6 22 Ohio St. 2d 197, 259 N.B.2d 501 (1970). In this instance the court did not specifically
rely on Afarkus because that case more clearly addressed the question of ballot sufficiency. The
rationale by which the court in Sidwell based its decision was articulated in the 4th syllabus of
the Markus case. The court in Sidwell stated:
... mhe 4th syllabus of the farkus case cited above.... states, "the text of the
ballot statement resulting from a referendum petition must fairly and accurately pre-
sent the question or issue to be tried in order to assure a free, intelligent and informed
vote by the average dtizen affected." The court feels that the same criterion should be
followed in the wording of the referendum petitions. Sec 25 Ohio Misc. 104, 108.
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the wording of the petition specifically referred to the "Union Township
Zoning Regulations," which were a matter of public record, the petitions
"present[ed] to the signers thereof sufficient information for which to have
a free, intelligent and informed signature thereon. ' '7  The court, however,
noted that "the requirements on this petition are not spelled out in O.R.C.
519.12 ... [T]he Code, itself, does not require an exacting form for these
referendum petitions .... 8 Therefore, it is apparent that the court, on its
own initiative developed some guidelines on which to test the sufficency of
the information.
Since § 519.12' "does not require an exacting form for these referendum
petitions ..."10 considerable difficulty is raised, as was discussed in Pioneer
Development & Resources Corp. v. Delaware County Board of Elections."
There, the court, by distinguishing the Markus case, held zoning referendum
petitions to lower standards of content than were required in Sidwell. The
Pioneer court said that Markus did not apply to the question of sufficiency."
Therefore, the court assumed the burden of developing its own standard of
sufficiency by drawing an analogy between § 5 1 9 .1 2 la and § 731.31,14 which
sets forth the standards required of referendum petitions for municipal ordi-
nances. Since § 731.31 requires that a petition seeking to have a municipal
ordinance referred need only "contain the number and a full and correct
copy of the title of the ordinance or measure sought to be referred," 16 the
Pioneer court concluded:
Thus, it would seem by analogy that under the provisions of Section 519.12,
725 Ohio Misc. 104, 109.
8Id.
9OHIO REV. CODE § 519.12 (Page Supp. 1970).
10 25 Ohio Misc. 104, 109.
11 Civil Action No. 464, (Ct. App., Delaware County, April 14, 1971), appeal denied No.
71-541 (Ohio, Sept. 29, 1971).
12 In Markus, the referendum petition contained a statement which purported to state the
substance of the issue to be referred. The appellees in that case owned property, part of which
was zoned for commercial use and part of which was zoned for residential use. They succeeded
in getting a resolution passed which changed that part zoned residential to commercial.
When petitions were ciruclated regarding a referendum of that resolution, the statement
purporting to explain the issue gave the impression that the entire property, rather than a por.
tion, has been rezoned. In enjoining submission of the issue to the electors, the trial court
stated that the petitions were insufficient, inaccurate, and misleading. In affirming, the supreme
court stated only that judicial intervention was warranted "... because the petitions failed to
contain an accurate and unambiguous statement of the issue sought to be submitted to the eleo
torate." 22 Ohio St. 2nd 197, 202. The trial court's finding of irsufficiency was thus deleted
from the opinion of the supreme court, a fact which caused the court in Pioneer to state:
In the Markus case, the petitions were inaccurate, ambiguous and misleading....
We are unable to determine from a reading of the case that the petition would have
been held insufficient had the inaccuracy been omitted.
Civil Action 464, (Cc. App., Delaware County, April 14, 1971), appeal denied No. 71-541
(Ohio, Sept. 29, 1971).
13 OIo REv. CODE § 519.12 (Page Supp. 1970).




Revised Code, only the amendment or supplement to be referred to the
voters need be sufficiently designated without the necessity of setting forth
the text thereof. In the instant case, the referendum petition sets forth
the date the amendment or supplement was adopted by the Board of Trus-
tees and quotes verbatum the minutes of the Board by which such change
of zoning was adopted.16
Therefore the Pioneer court held that a zoning referendum petition is suf-
ficient if a single reference to the minutes of the meeting at which the
board of trustees approved the amendment is made.
It is apparent from the discussion of the above cases that the standards
for the content of referendum zoning petitions are not prescribed by stat-
ute and have thus been decided by the courts on an ad hoc basis. Both
Sidwell and Pioneer suggest standards, but not only are those standards
conflicting, the cases themselves simply hold the respective challenged pe-
titions to be sufficient, which suggests that a somewhat lower standard
might also be permissible. The remainder of this note will therefore
attempt to develop guidelines from which a uniform standard may be de-
rived. Thereafter the standards provided by Sidwell and Pioneer will be
compared to the model.1'7
The basis for deriving a minimum standard may be approached by a
three-step process. First, by knowing what interest is protected by requir-
ing minimum standards of content in the petitions for various kinds of ref-
erenda; second, by evaluating the interest in relation to the size of the
electorate (state wide referenda, municipal referenda, township zoning ref-
erenda); and third, by determining whether that interest is protected in
cases, unlike township zoning referenda, when the standards are dearly
stated by statute.
The interest protected by requiring the petition (or circulator) to in-
form the prospective signer of the precise issue is the right of the majority
to have the legislation enacted by their elected representatives take effect.Y8
16 Civil Action No. 464, (Ct App., Delaware County, April 14, 1971), appeal denied No.
71-541 (Ohio, Sept. 29, 1971). In this case the minutes of the board of trustees, quoted in the
petitions, were not informative as to the precise issue. They merely stated:
Mr. Schuette moved a motion to accept the Zoning Commission recommendation
on the application of Pioneer Development and Resources Corporation to re-zone 198
acres to R-S. Mr. Davidson seconded the motion. Roll call vote--Mr. Tone, yes; Mr.
Davidson, yes; Mr. Schuette, yes.
17 The development of this standard for township zoning referenda appears to be a legislative
function. Since the general assembly has so far declined to set the standards, the task must be
undertaken by the courts.
I8 There appear to be several values and interests protectd by requiring the petition state-
ment to be minimally informative. There is, for example, the prospective signer's interest in
avoiding being defrauded, and the interest of the circulator in getting electors to sign the peti-
tion (since prospective signers are often unlikely to sign if they are insufficiently informed).
Given the narrow scope of this note, however, these and other such interests may b.- negated for
purposes of analysis.
The interests of the signer in avoiding fraud is protected by the requirement that the state-
meat of the issue on the ballot be clear, unambiguous, and informative. An investigation into
the standards for the ballot statement is beyond the scope of this paper. The interest of the cir-
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While it is obvious that a referendum election is an exercise in pure democ-
racy, the procedure by which such an election is procured is essentially
unrepresentative, that is, overriding for a time the rights of the majority.
This point was recognized in Ohio Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Hagerty,1"
when the court stated:
Care was taken by the general assembly, as will be hereafter pointed out,
to protect the voice of the majority, once an election is had, from being
stifled by technical objections. The power and rights of a majority duly
expressed at an election, however, are not to be confused with the power
and rights of a minority seeking an election. It is not a majority, but
(a small minority]20 of the voting population that calls a referendum. This
minority of one-tenth of the voters, by the filing of a proper petition, ....
suspend[s] the legislative power of the council, representing all the people,
for a period as short as forty days or as long as thirteen months and more.
This extraordinary power, given so small a proportion of the voting pub-
lic, it would seem, is not to be exercised by it except by a full and strict
compliance with the statute from which that power is derived. It is a grant
of a special right to the minority and cannot be enlarged by construction.2t
To protect the interests of the majority, it was fell: therefore that certain
safeguards should be required, insuring that the minority be so informed
as to the issue that they could make an intelligent decision; that legislation
should not "be suspended and a referendum had by securing the casual sig-
natures of voters unacquainted with purport and possible effect of the pro.
posed referendum." 2 The importance of protecting the rights of the ma-
jority by requiring the petitioning minority to be adequately informed
varies under existing law according to the number of people affected. At
the state level, where statutes passed by the General Assembly are sub-
jected to referenda, the matter was "deemed so important that it was not
left to mere statute, nor was it left to be determined by the courts upon
extrinsic evidence that the voters were correctly advised of the object of
the proposed referendum. 2 3 The standards by which the prospective sign-
ers of the petitions were to be advised of the issues are enumerated in the
Ohio Constitution. 4 Thus at the state level, where the entire population
culator in getting signers to sign is one which is not properly cognizable by the court, since it is
easily correctable by the circulator himself.
19 14 Ohio App. 398 (Ct. App., Lawrence County 1921).
20 The case presented to the court in Hagerty concerned petitions for a referendum of a
municipal ordinance. The relevant statute, § 4227-4, Ohio General Code, provides that a num.
ber equal to ten percent of the votes cast at the last gubernatoriad election sign the petition,
Section 519.12 of the Ohio Revised Code, requires only a number equal to eight percent.
21 14 Ohio App. at 400-401.
22 Id. at 403.
23Id.
24 OHo CoNsT. art. 2, § I(g). This sets out several requirements for notice to the elector-
ate. Not all of those requirements are directly related to the petitions, but the intent to advise
the public as to the issue can clearly be seen. In point, it requires:
(1) That full and correct copy of the title and text of the law to be referred
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of the state is affected by the referendum, the standards for the contents of
a petition are strict and are dearly aimed at requiring the signer to make
an intelligent informed choice. At the municipal level, where the number
of persons subjected to the counter-representative effect of the petition
phase of the referenda is significantly reduced, the formal requirements
are correspondingly reduced. The framers of the constitution decided not
to require that municipal referenda petitions be subject to the same re-
quirements as petitions asking for statewide referenda. Section 1(f) of
article II of the Ohio Constitution specifically provides that powers of ref-
erendum are to be regulated by statute.-  Section 731.31 -6 was enacted
pursuant to article II, § 1(f) and provides the standards for petition con-
tent at the municipal level. Petitions are required to contain only the num-
ber and correct title of the ordinance, a reduced requirement from the state
level when the full text is required. The other requirement of § 731.31
is that the affidavit of the circulator must state that the circulator believed
the signers to have signed "with knowledge of the contents thereof.'i
Since § 519.12 fails to require any standard whatever for the contents
of the petition, it would seem reasonable to follow the logical progression
and lower the standard still further for the township zoning cases. Analy-
sis of the rationale of the Pioneer decision shows however, that the lowest
productive standard has been reached at the municipal level. To lower
the standards any further would be contrary to the goals of having an in-
formed signer and avoiding any possible fraud or misrepresentation. As
stated above, the petitions in Pioneer contained only the date of the meet-
ing at which the resolution passed the township board of trustees, and the
minutes of that meeting.-2 8 If the standards were reduced below the mini-
mum required at the municipal level, a full and correct title of the resolu-
tion and an affidavit by the circulator that each signer "signed with knowl-
edge of the contents thereof," there would be no assurance whatever that
the majority's interest would not "be suspended and a referendum had by
securing the casual signatures of voters unacquainted with the purport and
possible effect of the proposed referendum.""9
It is apparent that the court in Pioneer lowered the standard below
(2) That the drculator of the petition swear that the signers signed with knowledge of the
contents thereof
(3) Petitions come from V the counties of the state
(4) That arguments for and against the issue be published and sent to the electorate.
25 Id. at § 1(f). In pertinent part § 1(f) states that "tr]he initiative and referendum powers
are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality ... such powers shall be exercised in the
manner now or hereafter provided by law."
2 6 Oo REv. CODE § 731.31 (Page 1954).
27 Id. This second requirement, which is a significant factor regarding the amount of notice
required, was apparently overlooked by the court in Pionccr when it drew the analogy between
§ 731.31 and § 519.12.
2s See supra note 16.
29 14 Ohio App. 398, 403.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
that required at the municipal level. It did so, however, through an in-
complete reasoning process. In drawing the analogy between § 731.31 and
the township zoning statute, § 519.12, the court failed to consider the sec-
ond requirement in § 731.31, that signators "sign such petitions with knowl-
edge of the contents thereof." In the case of municipal ordinances, where
only the tide, and not the text, of the ordinance is required to be repro-
duced on the face of the petition, this second requirement is the most sub-
stantial safeguard, insuring that the signers have made a fair, intelligent
and informed decision. The same is true of township zoning cases, like
Pioneer, when only a reference to the meeting at which the Board of Trus-
tees passed the resolution is made to introduce the prospective signer to
the issue.
The court in Sidwell affirmed the validity of petitions which conformed
to higher standards than those required by § 731.31. The petitions in that
case contained a copy of the text of the proposed amendment (although
again no mention was made of requiring the circulator's affidavit). While
the standard attained by the petitions in Sidwell may be desirable, it is in-
consistent to require that standard at the township level in the face of a
lower statutory standard at the municipal level.
The result should, therefore, be a synthesis of the standards allowed in
Pioneer and the one attained in Sidwell. The reasoning of the court in
Pioneer should be adopted; that is, the analogy between § 731.31 and §
519.12 should be drawn, but the entire standard as detailed in § 731.31
should be adopted and applied to § 519.12. Therefore, in order for a zon-
ing petition to be sufficient, it must contain:
(1) Full and correct copy of the title of the zoning resolution, and
(2) Circulator's affidavit that signers "signed such petition with knowl-
ledge of contents thereof."
The difficulty of such an incorporation of standards into § 519.12 is, of
course, that it is not required by the statutory language. That problem
can only be remedied by the General Assembly. On the other hand, a
minimum standard is required by common sense, and until enacted by the
General Assembly should be incorporated into § 519.12 by the courts.
Frederick R. Reed
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